Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. The State of Kerala and Ors
Tanvi Sondkar
Advocate Balasaheb Apte College of Law
This Case Commentary is written by Tanvi Sondkar, a Third-Year Law Student of Advocate Balasaheb Apte College of Law


Year:2018
Jurisdiction: India
Law(s):
Article 14, Article 15, Article 17, Article 21, Article 25, Article 26, Article 51, of Constitution.
Bench Strength: 5
Case Type/Origin: Civil Writ Petition
Case Status: Under Review
Number of Opinion(s): 4
Case Citation: (2019) 11 SCC 1
Aspect (s) of privacy: Dignity & Autonomy
Case Brief
The Constitution Bench received this matter from a three-judge Supreme Court panel. The Lord Ayyappan is the focus of the Sabarimala Temple. According to the Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 (KHPW Act), Rule 3(b) prohibits women between the ages of 10 and 50, who are considered to be menstruation, from entering the temple. It was requested of the Court to pronounce on the legality of this regulation and to direct the local government representatives and temple officials to make this rule easier to follow.
Because it prevented women from exercising their right to religious freedom under Article 25(1), the Court's majority decision invalidated the contested Rule 3(b). Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that an exemption should be made because the Rule was an essential religious practice of a different theological denomination. Although religious institutions are free to manage their affairs under Article 26(b), most of the Court did not think that Lord Ayyappa's devotees qualified as a separate religion. As Hindus, they were protected by Article 25(2)(b), which permitted the restructuring of Hindu religious institutions.
The Court stressed that the constitution forbade any practice that discriminated against or separated persons based only on biological characteristics, thereby violating women's autonomy, freedom, and dignity. A woman's menstrual status is an integral aspect of who she is and her privacy, and the Court made it clear that disclosing the information to the public would violate her right to privacy under Article 21. The menstrual status of a woman is deeply personal and an intrinsic part of her privacy. The Constitution must treat it as a feature based on which no exclusion can be practiced and no denial can be perpetrated.
Facts
This case was referred from a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. vs. State of Kerala and Ors. ((2017) 10 SCC 689). The case was centered around the Sabarimala shrine, which is a Hindu temple dedicated to God Ayyappan, in Kerala. As per tradition, women of menstruating age, i.e., between 10-50 years, were not allowed to enter the temple as the temple was dedicated to a celibate God, and there was a belief that women of menstruating age would cause an affront to the value of celibacy in the Temple.
This exclusion was justified based on ancient custom, which was legitimized by Rule 3(b), framed under the KHPW Act. Rule 3(b) provided for the exclusion of “women at such time during which they are not by custom and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship.”
The Kerala High Court, in the case of S. Mahendran vs. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthapuram and Ors (AIR 1993 Ker. 42) had held that such a restriction was not violative of the fundamental rights of women under the Constitution. The matter was finally placed before a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court.
Issues
A. Whether a practice that excluded women based on a biological factor that was unique to the female gender violated Articles 14, 15, and 17 without being protected by "morality" as defined in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution;
B. Whether the practice of excluding such women qualified as an "essential religious practice" under Article 25 and whether a religious institution could claim in that regard under the protection of the right to manage its affairs in matters of religion;
C. Did Ayyappa Temple have a denominational character? If yes, was it acceptable for a "religious denomination" run by a statutory board and funded by the Consolidated Fund of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to transgress constitutional morality?
D. Did Rule 3(b) of the KHPW Rules, 1965 violate Part III of the Constitution if it was deemed to be intra vires the KHPW Act, 1965?
Arguments
Since there is no constitutional foundation for creating a distinct, excluded class of women between the ages of 10 and 50, the petitioners claimed that the discrimination against women who are menstruating is arbitrary under Article 14. Furthermore, they contended that, for Article 26, the Lord Ayyappa temple and its followers did not represent a distinct religious sect.
Furthermore, one of the Intervening Applications (No. 10 of 2016) claimed that women's right to privacy was violated by the requirement to disclose menstruation status. They argued that denying menstruation women access was discriminatory and violated their dignity, citing the ruling in K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. vs. Union of India ((2017) 10 SCC 1).
The Respondents argued that Rule 3(b) was constitutional because it did not forbid admittance for all women as a class, but rather only restricted women of a specific age group from access for a specific reason. The Amicus Curiae, Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, further argued that since the followers of Lord Ayyappa would be considered a religious cult, they were not subject to the reform requirements of Article 25 and could instead operate independently under Article 26.
Amicus Curiae Mr. Raju Ramchandran argued that the implementation of the exclusionary practice required women to disclose their age and menstrual status involuntarily, which amounted to forced disclosure and violated their right to privacy and dignity under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, as recognized in the Puttaswamy ruling.
Decision
The Supreme Court, in a 4:1 verdict, held that the restrictions upon the entry of women between the ages of 10-50 into the Sabrimala shrine were unconstitutional and struck down Rule 3(b) of the KHPW Act. The Court further passed directions to ensure the safety of women pilgrims entering the shrine. The majority held that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa did not constitute a separate religious denomination but were part of the Hindu fold and that in the absence of any scriptural or textual evidence justifying the same, the exclusion of women could not be considered to be an essential religious practice. The opinion also observed that Rule 3(b) was ultra vires the aim of the KHPW Act, which was to reform and open public Hindu places to all people. The Court further declared that Rule 3(b) of the KHPW Rules was unconstitutional for being violative of Part III of the Constitution of India.
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud further observed that the social exclusion of women, based on physiological attributes like menstrual status, was comparable to a form of untouchability, following notions of “purity and pollution”, which served to stigmatize individuals and could not be justified in the scheme of constitutional morality, besides being explicitly prohibited under Article 17. Concerning the right to privacy, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud in his opinion, held that the menstrual status of a woman would be an intrinsic part of her privacy. He further opined those imposing exclusionary disabilities based on menstrual status, violated the dignity of women which was guaranteed by the Constitution.
Justice I. Malhotra, in her dissenting opinion, noted that the case should fail for lack of standing by the Petitioners. She also held that Ayyappans or worshippers at the Sabarimala Temple satisfied the requirements of being a religious denomination, and therefore could avail the protections of Article 26. She further held that the limited restriction on the entry of women would not be violative of Part III of the Constitution.
(A larger bench was tasked with adjudicating this case following the hearing of a review petition (Review Petition (Civil) No. 3358/2018 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373/2006). Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented from the majority ruling, which was given by Chief Justice R. Gogoi, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, and Justice I. Malhotra. A nine-judge bench of the court responded in the affirmative to an initial query about whether a reference to a larger bench may be maintained in a review petition.)